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**HOXHA'S CLASS WAR:
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
AND STATE REFORMATION, 1961-1971**

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So long as the complete victory of the revolution in the areas of ideology and culture has not been ensured, the victories of the socialist revolution in the economic and political fields can neither be secured nor guaranteed.¹

Between 1961 and 1971, a period within which Albania's "cultural revolution" takes place, all previous social and economic policies underwent dramatic revision. Forced to choose between increasing international obscurity or to aggressively resist the forces of change, Enver Hoxha, as in the period during and immediately after the war, utilized his regime's capacity to manipulate social anxieties and hatreds in order to secure a firm grip of the powers of state. As in earlier attempts to project the state's hegemony, particularly in respect to controlling the population in Northern Albania, Hoxha exploited the polemical currents within contemporary Marxism as manifested in China and the Soviet Union by manipulating Albania's evolving external relations to secure ascendancy over Albanian political and social life.² The 1961-71 period under review is indicative of the important nuances of the practice of rule in Albania, demonstrating the profound range of Hoxha's capacity to manipulate the social, political and economic currents of Albanian society and is a reminder how important it is for scholars to avoid applying limited analytical frameworks to the study of the postwar Balkans.³

Throughout the postwar years, Albania's sociopolitical environment, which endured extensive state interference, had often been subtly linked to external events. Heavily dependent on a diet of economic aid that subsidized the expansive but widely inefficient state role in industrial and agricultural development, the persistent weakening of Soviet altruism and Moscow's rapprochement with Tito during the late 1950s compromised Hoxha's often publicized ambitions. Stalin's untimely death forced Hoxha to acknowledge his

ambitions were caught in patterns of dependency which were quickly being transformed.⁴ Not only had the threat to Albanian independence been greater than ever in the late 1950s, but Hoxha's personal viability, along with his entourage, suddenly became questionable in the context of ideological revisionism in the Soviet Union.⁵

The dramatic turn of Hoxha's external fortunes in many ways came at a most unfortunate moment for his domestic project. The Albanian economy was in the middle of an ambitious industrialization program that aspired to make Albania self-sufficient in a variety of sectors.⁶ Hoxha's options were dramatically reduced as relations between the USSR and Albania grew increasingly tense resulting in a significant reduction in vital Soviet aid.

The period under study here is emblematic of Hoxha's ability to adjust to this changing world order by manipulating the internal dynamics of Albanian society in order to solidify domestic power as well as adopt contradictory ideological positions in order to secure new alliances externally.⁷ It is also a remarkably revealing period for understanding the generally ignored internal tensions of Albanian politics of the time, especially events which were dubbed Hoxha's version of the Chinese cultural revolution.

THE MOOD SHIFTS, SLOWLY

The immediate period following Stalin's death suggests Hoxha had experienced a particularly acute sense of vulnerability. Without any clear external patron and reliant on a large bureaucracy manned by a body of cadres of questionable loyalty inspired Hoxha to make some interesting concessions in the period immediately preceding Albania's formal break with the Soviet Union. Albania took particular care to extenuate its relationship with the Soviet Union (and even Yugoslavia as events unfolded), in order to maintain a level of external normalcy while Hoxha's allies took the necessary measures which would secure the regime a solid base of support for the inevitable Albano-Soviet rift. Initially such measures primarily focused on Soviet policy towards its client states, which at the time faced a crisis in Hungary. It is a particularly telling example that Hoxha voiced support for the repression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising despite the threatening precedent such a measure had established for all regimes in the region that could potentially oppose new Soviet policy.⁸

While the Albanian archives fail to reveal the sense of insecurity I suggest Hoxha was beginning to experience at the time of

Khrushchev's reforms, the alliance formally drawn with China in 1960 may be considered the best overt sign of Hoxha's advanced sense of vulnerability. What transpired before is often muddled in this atmosphere of public support of Soviet policy. While efforts were made at a superficial level to maintain cordial relations with Khrushchev even after 1960, increasingly, the numerous attempts by Soviet-led international bodies to assert more control over Albania's economic production from Stalin's death onwards and Khrushchev's abrasive personality led to increasingly strained public relations between the two leaders.⁹

The immediate result of broken ties with the Eastern Bloc was a potential sign of weakness for Hoxha within the regime.¹⁰ One should, however, note a meticulously crafted counter measure materialized in Albanian politics at the time which both anticipated the break and was meticulously preparing for such a break. If we were to interpret the transformations that take place throughout the 1960s as a collaborative effort between China and Albania to eliminate elements in their respective societies whose loyalties may have remained with Moscow, the Albanian Cultural Revolution itself becomes a much more complex and meaningful historical moment. I see links in Hoxha's cultural revolution and international Communism's dramatic shift in power with efforts to reconfigure Albanian society, once again, to the benefit of Hoxha's clan.¹¹ This period must be viewed, therefore, as an exhibition of Hoxha's political skill and ruthless capacity to shape his regime through social policies often contradictory to past state ideology.

MEETING OF THE MINDS

The most obvious starting point for understanding this period is the multitude of external transformations taking place. The Sino-Albanian alliance is a remarkable example of ideological collaboration at a time when two distinct camps were still forming in international Communism. Despite their distinctive social agendas the relationship between China and Albania grew more intimate during the early years of the shift in International Communism. I use the Albanian cultural revolution as a symbol of this developing relationship for it reveals, paradoxically, that its rhetorical construction and administrative articulation was not wholly contingent to shared ideological or operational structures with its allies. It should be emphasized from the beginning that Albania's "cultural revolution"

is not a mirror-image of Chairman Mao's anarchic exploitation of youthful enthusiasm. Enver Hoxha had no use for the rudder-less chaos that destroyed China's cultural infrastructure. Hoxha had a very specific agenda that could utilize the ideological legitimacy, at an international level, that joining forces with China would bring without the radical disruption of social structures domestically. The timing of the two movements and the similarities in state rhetoric clearly evidence a symbiosis of policy and, from Hoxha's perspective, a level of dependency on Chinese political and economic assistance. Hoxha, again, as with Stalin earlier and possibly the West during World War Two, used a patron's ideological and operational framework to enforce societal obedience and, in the case under particular scrutiny here, loyalty within the state and party infrastructure.

I suggest that Hoxha's primary concern was the legacy of his relationship with the USSR. With hundreds of Moscow-trained functionaries permeating Hoxha's state, it was clear an open confrontation with potentially pro-Khrushchev forces had to be avoided. Hoxha elected to use a complex and long-term policy that set up, in stages, a coalition built on fear. This coalition would be used to successfully purge the potentially dangerous elements of a now defunct alliance during the cultural revolution. There is a trail of events which illuminate this.

The scheme started at the Fourth APL Congress which opened with a series of speeches from the two principle benefactors of the Albanian version of the future "cultural revolution." Both Enver Hoxha and his Premier, Mehmet Shehu, initiated what they called a "two-front war" against imperialism and "modern revisionism." In this readjustment, Hoxha's first act was to introduce the new ideological campaign of "Communist education" to the public. Officially, this campaign's principle goal was to create a socialist society untainted by the unfortunate exposure to Moscow's poisonous revisionism.

The complete construction of a socialist society will not be realized without building *a new person with new ideas*, with exalted virtues and high morals. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois remnants in the consciousness of the people make a serious barrier to the complete victory of socialism in Albania.... A great effort must be made to overcome this.¹²

As Khrushchev's revisions served as the implied target for Hoxha's criticism, the real target was the general population within Albania. For Hoxha, the task was to redefine Albanian society despite the enormous human capital invested into indoctrinating a generation to associate Moscow as the loyal ally of Albania. In the next four years, in preparation for an explosion of internal purges and public displays of redefined ideological orthodoxy, the evolution of this policy mobilized the masses in interesting ways.

It should be kept in mind that throughout the period, the "northern problem" remained a concern. Hoxha continued attacking the "attitudes, traditions, and organizations" that threatened the process of "modernizing" Albanian society. But as Stalin disappeared from the idiom of international communism, Hoxha's second preoccupation with Soviet-trained officials began to dominate the literature of the period. In conjunction with his attacks on tradition, Hoxha began to enumerate certain societal ills attached to the ideological currents of the outside world. In conjunction to these inventories of the profane, a variety of state-led campaigns for the preservation of "doctrinal purity," and the "reconfirmation of one's loyalty to Stalin," were introduced.¹³ Over time, Hoxha would introduce a number of such campaigns to help determine the content and the parameters of social and political change in Albania while leaving enough space between his measures and the potentially dangerous block of Moscow-trained cadres.

As evidenced in the literature, the mechanism to pursue "doctrinal purity" and a continued attack on tribal and Catholic Albania was the cornerstone to the program of "Communist education." One of the major efforts of this program was to refine the content of ideological dissemination in Albania. By 1961, the People's Assembly had approved a plan to rid the educational system of all the Soviet influences that had penetrated it over the years. Of particular interest here is the vehicle through which Hoxha's state enacted these reforms. While the rhetoric would initially suggest otherwise, an intriguing means to such an end was the attempt to "integrate academic work with productive work."¹⁴

While it was too early for Hoxha's true intentions to surface, it is a fascinating exercise to observe the preparation taking place. Among many living in Albania at the time, the tension within the Albanian state escaped notice. To many, it was the split with the Soviet Union, and ultimately the Soviet Block, which induced a sense of grave concern, not out of patriotism or love for Hoxha, it should

be noted, but for the possible consequences to their daily lives. It was reported severe shortages in power and fuel accompanied the return of rationing in some rural areas. In conjunction, the presence of more security forces, especially in Tirana, left many to believe something quite explosive had or was about to occur, external to the obscure speeches about education reform.¹⁵ Clearly, Albania's attention had been focused on international affairs while a patient, ever-silent storm brew in Hoxha's head.

Until the beginning of 1963, Albania, often by itself, waged an ideological war with the Soviet Block. Some suggest this aggressive policy was a means to shelter China which was just beginning to recover from its disastrous "Great Leap Forward."¹⁶ Such a viewpoint seems all the more plausible considering the collaboration between Mao and Hoxha after China's economic recovery in 1963. After 1963, China, now capable of shouldering the economic responsibility of a leader in the Communist world, assumed Albania's role as ideological champion of Stalinism in the international arena. China also began to provide Albania with a more or less adequate replacement of Soviet economic assistance.

No longer burdened with the role as the sole international mouthpiece for Stalinism, Hoxha's state was free to begin a concerted effort to speed up the process of acclimatizing the Party and society for the forthcoming revolution. At this stage, articles appeared in various Party publications complaining about social and ideological "shortcomings." Still cautious not to direct his attacks towards the large and potentially dangerous Moscow-trained segment of his party, Hoxha elected to isolate specific groups within Albanian society. References to the "anti-socialist," "idealistic," and "humanistic" attitudes of Albanian youth which led to a culture of "poor labor discipline" both in the agricultural and industrial sectors, marked Hoxha's first point of attack.¹⁷ After declaring that the countryside (where up to two-thirds of the population lived), lacked the proper "socialist spirit," the Albanian Labor Party (APL) commenced a campaign in June 1963 to uproot the "bourgeois" and "patriarchal" attitudes that persisted there.¹⁸ As the country's economic difficulties became more pronounced (and greater reason for internal tensions to mount), Hoxha offered students and workers as sacrificial lamb. The campaign for "Communist education" so cherished in 1961, as far as the state was concerned, was falling on deaf ears and initially at least, blame rested with the masses.

The "unsatisfactory state of affairs" called for subtle changes in the composition of the Party as a whole. At this stage, Hoxha sought to increase the Party's presence in the countryside by "bringing in" more members from Albanian urban areas. There were also public calls for expanded participation by the youth and workers in the functions of the state and increased diligence in the working habits of workers. The intent of these measures becomes clear, I would suggest, when we consider why non-party members were singled out at these early stages. The main thrust of these reforms were designed to be disseminated by the intellectual community, which, according to Enver Hoxha, also needed to go through its own reform.¹⁹ In a complex pattern of both threatening and encouraging both intellectuals and workers, Hoxha created a dynamic of willing collaboration which would have great utility for the state as his reforms advanced in scope.

In July of 1964, Hoxha, by way of Ramiz Alia, produced the general outline for the ideological and cultural revolutions that would commence two years later. Much of what was stated, again, focused on the "traces of bourgeois influences" and was now clearly meant to identify all Soviet-trained intellectuals. The struggle for the minds of the Albanian people and the fact that their failures to date, as evidenced by economic short comings, meant the Party's role had to be increased, intensifying "Communist education" of *all* segments of Albanian society.²⁰ Hoxha initiated his tactful dismantling of a society he had created in the 1950s by first reforming those who had the smallest capacity to resist. At some point, while admittedly difficult to determine the criteria for shifting his focus, Hoxha directed his coercive mechanism on the most visible purveyors of the Soviet line and often, the most resented: the intellectual.

The emergence at this time of Ramiz Alia as a leading figure of this new generation of political intellectuals in which social roles were redefined, proves significant on several levels. Alia, the eventual successor to Hoxha in 1985 and the man responsible for the opening up of Albanian society to the rest of the World in the late 1980s, was a Gheg by birth. It will be recalled that APL leadership was overwhelmingly Tosk. Alia proved to be a cunning and loyal aide to Hoxha and for a variety of illuminating reasons, was given the task to introduce, as if to soften the apparent concerns of Tosk hegemony, the new proposals in the cultural realm. It may be speculated that Alia provided a potential scapegoat for the initial challenge of disrupting the hierarchies of the Albanian state. Serving as a

symbol to the rest of the country about the significance of the changes taking place, I suggest Alia was both a safety valve who could be subsequently blamed for any future failures and a reliable figure within an environment filled with powerful individuals with old-links to Moscow. Alia, as a Gheg, was isolated within the inner workings of the Tosk-dominated party and was an unlikely source of dissension in respect to the implementations of Hoxha's restructuring of Albania's society. Loyalty in Hoxha's Albania had always been one based on fear and opportunism and Alia's history provides a perfect example of such a dynamic.

The attack on the old intellectual order continued for several years. In October 1965 Alia and Hoxha criticized the Albanian Union of Writers and Artists for failing to curb "unmarxist habits" in the arts and literature as well as ignoring the "unhealthy" trends that included, not surprisingly, Soviet revisionism.²¹ On several occasions Hoxha found it imperative to specifically target the generic intellectual as the source of Albania's collective ideological impurity:

...due to their position and the role they play in leading and organizing work, and the *individual* nature of their work, the intellectuals are susceptible to alien bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints, ideology, politics, and ethics; they may detach themselves from the masses, to exaggerate their role, ability and talents, to place themselves above the masses.²²

With hindsight, the deliberate steps leading towards the apex of Hoxha's reforms in 1966 seem extraordinarily cautious. It is very hard to determine just how powerful the pro-Soviet (or anti-Hoxha) faction actually was within the Party and there is no documented evidence to suggest they actively opposed Hoxha during the early periods of Hoxha's reforms, but it is clear that there was a great deal of tentativeness at hand. Hoxha's initial targets were artists and workers whose roles in Albania often required that they bear the brunt of state reforms. They were the easiest targets who offered the least resistance. I suggest for the very reason of their impotence, the worker and the Albanian intellectual were actually being cultivated by Hoxha.

The reason for Hoxha's pronounced caution was in response to the problem of party loyalty. Among those who were eventually victimized by Hoxha's cultural revolution, many were members of the alliance Hoxha had formed in the late 1940s. As noted above, almost all his cadres were of Tosk origin. The emergence of Ramiz

Alia and the eventual, if limited, persecution of certain Tosk figures, appear to have direct links with one another. Again, the ambiguous allegiance between Alia and Hoxha could only be explained by the fact that Alia, whose regional and linguistic identity left him all but isolated (and incapable of forming alliances), was not a threat to Hoxha's immediate interests.²³ Hoxha lost trust in the middle sector of his regime despite their overwhelmingly Tosk composition because of their long relationship with Moscow.²⁴ Hoxha could not rapidly dispose of this significant class of middle managers, administrators, and other party functionaries out of fear of a violent reaction. This is the same, cautious man who during the war flirted with the West and started a cultural war with Albanian nationalists to solidify his hold on the partisan movement in Albanian. In the 1960s Hoxha needed Mao, the Albanian worker and intellectual as he needed Stalin and southern Albanians after the war. By exerting enough coercive pressure on the working and intellectual classes, not only was Hoxha instilling a fear that would result in loyalty in the future, he also bought time for China to provide the ideological and economic legitimacy Hoxha needed in his confrontation with large segments of the party elite.

THE FIRST STAGE

Hoxha's true thoughts at the time are sadly disguised by verbose statements found in contemporary materials and all but fabricated in the revisionist historiography of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In order to justify my analysis, I would suggest the latter half of the 1960s provides a window into the internal dynamics of decision-making in the Hoxha regime. As has been seen, a slow trickle of rhetoric focusing on institutional reform made its way into the general public. Again, not necessarily perceived as a sign of the times to come, the mounting pressures on the various sectors of Albanian society failed to illuminate the writing on the wall. It would take the blunt and very effective next stage to clarify just what were Hoxha's intentions.

Initially, subtle criticism of the work of enterprise directors found its way into the public. Such criticism began as exhortations of trade union organizations to do more "education work with the masses" and fatherly pressure for directors to be a "partyist" strictly following the "party line."²⁵ By October of 1965, however, the role of the Moscow-trained bureaucrat dramatically shifted. The PLA's

central committee issued a call, disseminated through various organs, that the masses themselves would participate in the drawing up of the Fourth Five-Year plan rather than the managers. In this "appeal," it was the *masses* who were exposed to the threat of external pressures leveled upon Albania, the present economic and, no doubt material short comings. The *masses* were informed that imperialist and "revisionist enemies" had subjected Albania to an "economic blockade" and that the subsequent effort to improve the daily lives would have to be done relying on the *workers* of Albania alone. The shift from the role of the plant director and party cadres to the worker must be noted. The worker became, symbolically at least, the central element to Hoxha's reforms. In one dramatic moment, Albanian society had been asked to transform itself. In the official history of this period, the discussions called for by the PLA not only took place but were completely successful:

In response to the call of the glorious Party, the masses talked about the indices of the Five-Year Plan in an enthusiastic and creative manner, with a profound and revolutionary conceptualization of responsibility as never before. In the plan they proposed to the Party and government, numerous indices went beyond even the most optimistic produced by state and economic organs.²⁶

In early 1961 the workers were identified as the culprits for Albania's failure. By 1965 Hoxha discovered it was the worker, armed with "a deep and revolutionary conceptualization of responsibility" who was the ideal reformer.

It is instructive that most articles published at the time stressed the benevolence of previous "appeals" of the state; the coercive language so evident in earlier periods in Albania had clearly been toned down in attempt to gain the confidence of a larger public. The attempt to open up a benign channel of communication, attracting a segment of a population which had been historically intimidated by Hoxha's state, in very subtle ways offered an opportunity for those willing to take it. This is what I call Hoxha's subliminal class warfare. By cultivating the envious worker to first, feel threatened by recriminations, then be offered the chance to reaffirm his loyalty and part-take in society's reform was an opportunity many did not decline.

The first explicit signs of what Adi Schnytzer suggests is an attempt to put supplemental "hierarchical pressure from above on

directors with party-led pressure below"²⁷ materializes in the Albanian press. In December of 1965, an unsigned article was published offering a detailed exposé of the excessively bureaucratic nature of the day-to-day business performed in the Durrës district.²⁸ This famous article set the tone through which Hoxha's state would finally abandon its cover behind obscure ideological subtleties and find the political strength to attack the elements threatening it. Not surprisingly, in what seems to be the end of the preparational stage of the cultural revolution, the APL at the same time of the article, issued a series of directives that ordered a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, the decentralization of some government agencies and the elimination of "the bureaucratic style and method" in the administration of both the party and state. While the propaganda mechanism in the initial stages of Hoxha's reforms spewed out ambiguous and often meaningless proclamations about "communist education" there was subsequently never a clear indication of the target. In December of 1965, on the other hand, the state finally identified the culprit of these social shortcomings. At last, the affront to an established, and now obsolete party structure was to take place.²⁹

In February 1966, the Central Committee of the PLA issued a statement that outlined the new role for all Party figures. Again, seen from a distance and with hindsight, the Hoxha state was laying the parameters for its eventual purge. Those found in need of "re-education" were either to make their way to volunteer work camps, (a benign way of introducing the victim of Albania's cultural revolution to imprisonment) or spend time in the "field." According to the PLA, many cadres had already "volunteered to work in production after the 1965 Appeal." These initial activities soon transformed into outright persecution of those not making the right decisions. The rapid transition has been recorded in the official *History* of the PLA and I quote at length:

Within a record time the reorganizations of the state and party apparatus in the center and in the districts on a sounder revolutionary basis was effected. The administration of state enterprises and agricultural cooperatives were also reorganized and made simpler. The number of ministries was reduced, unnecessary offices and branches were combined.... The staff of the central state administration was reduced by half. About 15,000 cadres of the administration went over to production, especially in the countryside. A good number of cadres, among them top

cadres of the Party and the state, were sent from the center to the base. The simplification of the administrative apparatus was accompanied by a profound reduction of correspondence, thus replacing [red tape] with living work with the people...always in line with the principle of democratic centralism.³⁰

In addition to an increase in the labor force at the base of Albanian society, a campaign began to involve all state employees in physical production. Again, according to the official *History*:

a major movement began, *to link mental work with physical work with production*. People engaged in mental work voluntarily went 'en masse' to help the peasantry in agricultural tasks. In line with the decision of the Central Committee to reorganize on a sounder basis the direct participation in production of men engaged in mental work, all the employees of the administration, men and women engaged in scientific and cultural work, started to work in production, particularly in the countryside, *one month every year*; in addition, tens of thousands of young people from high and middle schools participated in *voluntary* mass actions of construction and production.³¹

While spending parts of the summer working in the fields during childhood was a normal event for all teenagers in the so-called Eastern Bloc, the sheer number and serious nature of the labor in Albania's case exhibits a greater function. The policing and punitive qualities of the "work" and the abusive powers given to loyal "volunteers" exhibited the complete degradation of power among selected intellectuals and middle-level bureaucrats.

The fact that many never got to leave their role as "volunteer," spending the rest of their lives in hard labor of course defies the positive characterizations shown above.³² The similarities with the Chinese experiences and later Cambodia indicate similar origins in governing strategies and the conceptualization of what constituted a viable party member. The goal of the state was to harvest a refined cadre, untainted by the irretrievable past. With Mao and the Gang of Four's inspiration, Hoxha was able to put the clamp on a middle party elite that was growing roots which spread beyond the grasp of his state. In less than four years Hoxha created a class war, pitting labor, party members, youth, and intellectual groups against each other, encouraging all to strive to win the praise and rewards granted by a "decentralized" and doctrinally pure state and a place in society that exempted them from, among other exhibitions of state disfavor, the labor camps.³³

The origins of these reforms, as I have argued, arose from internal tensions produced by the Soviet Union's rollback of Stalinism. While the economic consequences are significant products of rising Soviet-Albanian tensions, it should not be confused with the internal dynamics of the Albanian state. To some—Michael Kaser and to a lesser extent, Örjan Sjöberg—the reforms of 1961-1971 were a result of economic shortcomings. Both correctly pointed out that the third five-year plan (1960-5) had been seriously under fulfilled. The short comings of the economy and the rising tensions with the Eastern Bloc clearly occupied the energies of the PLA. In fact, the poor economic performance was on the agenda of the Party's new plan draft which was composed just weeks after the publication of the Party's 'Open Letter.'³⁴ These indicators of serious economic difficulties, however, do not justify the attempt to interpret the language of "decentralization" and "anti-bureaucracy" as mere references to economic issues. Such analysis reflects a classic case of obscuring the political situation with an occupational bias. Michael Kaser and his colleagues' economistic approach conceals the political and social realities of Albania at the time.³⁵

To put it simply, Hoxha was not a leader concerned with efficiency in his industrial sectors unless it assisted in strengthening his ability to monopolize power. From Nicholas Pano's perspective: "[The] Albanian Cultural Revolution [was] not designed to mask an inter-power struggle [rather it was] a unified effort by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor to reassert its authority over the regional and local Party organizations, rally the people behind the regime, and reestablish the Party's influence in all sectors of Albanian life."³⁶ If true, the attempts by the Party to regain influence among all sectors of Albanian life demonstrates how insecure Hoxha and his closest allies might have felt during the period under review here. I suggest issues of economic performance and industrial output were of secondary importance during this period and the "reforms" initiated reflected but a stage of a long-term effort to eliminate potentially dangerous elements within the Albanian state.

THE BOMBSHELL

Quickly following Hoxha's report of 1966, an article appeared in the Party daily, *Zëri i Popullit*, stressing 'the reorganization of the management system' (riorganizimi i sistemit të drejtimit).³⁷ This 'Open Letter,' considered as the official start of the Albanian cultural

revolution, initiated a direct attack on the state's mid-level cadres by stating unambiguously:

The bureaucracy that arose in the USSR was a great assistance to the Khrushchev revisionist in their capture of power. The establishment of a privileged class of party and state bureaucrats, economic directors, artists, scientist, and cultural figures, who were earning the most and enjoying a higher lifestyle from the workers...must be eliminated so that Albania will not repeat the Soviet experience.³⁸

I suggest this 'Open Letter' seeks to establish a public tone to the up-coming 'reforms.' Keeping in mind Pano's conclusion that the state instituted in this period an attempt to reestablish (I would suggest expand) "the party's influence in all sectors of Albanian life," the attempts to create a tension among those affected by these changes becomes important. The crude polarization of Albanian society, this time workers vs. managers, is a classic Hoxha (and Communist Party) tactic; the next few years would resemble a regulated version of the Chinese cultural revolution and a replay of Hoxha's attacks on Gheg culture after the war, this time focusing on the "privileged class of party and state bureaucrats."

The 'Open Letter' elaborated on a variety of planes the desired goal of obedience to the state. In one passage it declared

that every communist and worker should always view things from a political angle, each problem, whether economic, administrative or technical, whether of a state or any other character, should be assessed as to how much it is in the interests of the people, the Fatherland and Socialism.³⁹

This patriotic and dutiful tone creates an atmosphere of tension. No one can ignore the political consequences of events in a society so acculturated to political consequences. The invitation to part-take in the vigilance of state security (an implicit and later explicit invitation to spy on fellow-workers and family members) becomes feasible. When the first wave of public condemnations take place soon after the publication of the 1966 'Open Letter,' as done in the early post-war period with the symbolic and literal destruction of model enemies, Hoxha's state spent the next four years manipulating the communal strain created by individual attempts to earn party recognition.

At the fifth APL Congress, Hoxha promised that the "revolutionary initiatives" of 1966 were but the first stage of the "revolutionization" process.⁴⁰ Within the next year many state-sanctioned bureaucrats from Tirana and other regional capitals were transferred to outlying areas and appointed political figures infiltrated the armed forces. Hoxha's men were sent throughout the country to make sure the purges which were beginning to take place did not reach the proportions that would characterize China's cultural revolution. Hoxha's reforms were premeditated and elegantly refined.

Hoxha's own words continue to inform us about the atmospherics of this period. Hoxha's report to the fifth Party Congress in 1966 celebrated the battle to "bring state power and its apparatus closer to the broad masses of workers and peasants for the further development of their all-round creative initiative." He further encouraged the "initiative to broaden the participation of the cadres and of all the intelligentsia in production.... Vanguard workers went to lagging brigades in order to lead them forward."⁴¹ A rather chilling comparison can be made of Pol Pot's Cambodia. The "vanguard" workers disciplining the deviant was a recipe for abuse and an excessive articulation of power.

The depth of these changes is important because while they are evidenced in the very administrative and juridical structures of Albanian society, the formalities of these transformations are marginalized. New labor codes, for instance, were issued by September 1966,⁴² but the Hoxha regime at first was extremely ambivalent of these changes. It is illuminating that during the fifth Congress of the PLA, which took place in November of 1966, a month after the appearance of the new labor code, neither Enver Hoxha nor Mehmet Shehu made any mention of it in their speeches. It would take Enver Hoxha another two months to actually address the structural changes taking place which offered new powers to the masses in their expanded role which in sum

...is the check-up of the collective.... This means 'the control by the masses' and the 'policy of the masses' [as mentioned in the new labor code] all without exception, should submit to the judgment of the masses on their work and conduct in society. Communists should submit to a twofold control, to that of the Party and that of the masses.⁴³

The utility of Hoxha's rhetoric at the time was to illicit fear among middle-level bureaucrats while encouraging conformity and not promote legalities. These reforms were not about legal substance but about perceptions and ultimately action. The declaration of provisions for administrative and office workers to spend up to 100 days out in the field accompanied by the growing evidence that workers' were gaining greater control in the work place (always under the watchful eye of Hoxha loyalists) began to have the desired effect without the need of legal codes. Control was clearly being shifted in Albanian society exterior to the formalities of state bureaucracy:

...initiatives for the establishment of a revolutionary workers' control by organizing various control groups to deal with all the economic problems related to the successful implementation of the plans, and the regulation of all work in enterprises.⁴⁴

To put this in some historical context, by 1966 several other socialist economies had also attempted reforms of their economic mechanisms. Everywhere there was some decentralization of decision-making power, and everywhere, except in China, it had apparently been decided that the answer to society's problems lay partly in greater freedom for decision-making by enterprises. Even in China, there was a faction within the Communist Party in control of economic policy—later to be labeled by Mao Tse-tung as the 'capitalist roaders'—that had come to the same conclusion.

Eventually, however, the state in Albania contradicted the spirit of its public campaign of decentralization within the state hierarchy (leaving out the enterprise) by *increasing party* activity at the local level. Since the party and the worker and youth groups were always indelibly linked, the evolving shifts in the relations of political power resulted in expanded power for Enver Hoxha. In other words, Hoxha was expanding the state's presence in Albania as he, in an organized and relatively peaceful manner, eliminated Moscow-trained bureaucrats through the masses and intellectuals. As in China, the demonization of the state's enemies, this time an implication that revisionism and bourgeois sensibilities remained dormant in middle-ranking party officials, left an open door to Hoxha's regime to play with angers, jealousies and aspirations for more personal power.

In an attempt to sustain a direct "link" with the masses, Hoxha's directives were disseminated in local newspapers established just for this purpose. Of the many possible tools the state granted the masses

in their apparent struggle for the heart of Socialism, Hoxha offered the worker the wall poster to help identify the enemy of the state's reforms.

Do away with the existing and very ridiculous wall papers and turn them into revolutionary wall notices which will help revolutionary education. Do away with these wall bulletins with their editorial boards of opportunist scribblers who uphold the dignity and authority of the director and of themselves at the same time, and let everyone write what he thinks of work and of the people in bold face letters and without fear.⁴⁵

The *Flete-ruffe*, or wall newspaper, once the banal propaganda tool, was now a political weapon used to target "misguided" and "corrupted" officials and citizens. The process to consolidate the connection between the masses and the state is important since it explains why Hoxha was successful at controlling the violence and maintained absolute control of events.

The regime was pleased with its success. Mehmet Shehu, the second most powerful man in Albania noted that, after the instillation of the reforms' initial stage following the publication of the 'Open Letter,' "a new improved revolutionary appearance of the method and style of work and the complete and consistent resolution of state problems on the basis of the broad masses of the people" had emerged.⁴⁶ Again, the late 1965 early 1966 period demonstrates the depth of Hoxha's influence in the personnel make-up of the regime as well as its desire to direct society through symbolic gestures, use of phrases and the will to penetrate even deeper into the lives of his subjects by sacrificing some of his past allies.

HOXHA IN CONTROL

Throughout 1967, the Red Guards in China were wrecking havoc to Chinese social structures, often beyond the state's capacity to control events. In Albania on the other hand, a series of rallies were staged in Tirana throughout 1967 to mobilize members of the leading mass organizations, all of which were quite effective in instilling a culture of suspicion and fear.⁴⁷ Hoxha sought to create a movement for "working-class control" that looked more and more like an "invasion of red banners, portraits of Hoxha and Stalin and lots of suspicious stares."⁴⁸ With a firm hold on internal security and a capacity to control a growing popular desire to follow the party's

direction, the attacks went deeper into the core of the state during an address by Enver Hoxha on February 6, 1967. Faulting lower and middle-ranking state officials for their "failed revolutionary spirit," Hoxha promised that the main thrust of the state and its people thereafter would be directed at the *resistant* "bourgeois" legacies that plagued society.⁴⁹

On April 9, 1968, Hoxha noted the drive to create a society led by the "working class" had two main objectives: first, to use laborers as a counterpoise to the technocrats by creating workers' committees in enterprises; and second, to increase the responsibility of employees over morale and discipline.⁵⁰ The decentralization of economic planning and administration in individual factories was ordered and it was expected that the workers were to monitor the process. Not surprisingly, through the cover of the nation-wide campaign to eliminate "bourgeois" elements and an effort to "decentralize" the system, the state, in reality, increased its hold on society by inserting loyal officials in the military, spreading the scope of state penetration in schools and closing the final gap on social institutions that remained outside the state's control.⁵¹

The obvious consequences of such an effort would be greater state control. Indeed, by December, 1969 the Central Committee publicly launched two campaigns to actually undo the decentralization process initiated the year before. The "proletarian-discipline" and "actions-through-concentrated-blows" campaigns eliminated worker autonomy introduced to enable workers to direct attacks on Soviet-era managers. Once the Soviet-era managers were gone, it was clear that Hoxha was not prepared to allow a repeat of the Chinese cultural revolution and that he wanted to remind the obedient worker of the power of the state. The Albanian cultural revolution was entering a new phase.

These two campaigns introduced in December of 1969 stressed the need for workers to fulfill production norms, cut down on absenteeism and to value "voluntary" participation in public labor projects. Concerning this last requirement, these work policies were essentially manifested in schemes to assert power in thinly veiled calls for patriotism. Again, physical labor was used to establish state power. In Hoxha's words, not only were "voluntary" work brigades cheap sources of labor: two railways, Rrogozhina-Fier and Elbasan-Prrenjas, the Malësia e Madhe (Great Mountain) Highway were built and cross-country telephone lines erected, but these public works served as "great schools of revolutionary education."⁵² The scale in

which large percentages of the work force were involved in these "volunteer" drives to dig irrigation ditches, construct housing or plant trees in the 1969-1971 period completely contradicted and reversed the momentary empowerment of the masses.⁵³

The official line was decentralization via "reorganization."⁵⁴ Again, the process of decentralization was clearly a matter of semantics because "reorganization" meant enhanced state control. As it eliminated a portion of its troubled party, replacing them with ideologically-correct cadre, Hoxha's state terminated its reforms by 1971 with a new wave of purges.

Despite the claims of decentralization, the state actually enhanced its control over Albanian society between 1961-1971 by effectively exposing and removing potential opponents and infiltrating pockets of civil society previously inaccessible. It eliminated all organized religious institutions both in the South and the North and expanded state representation in rural areas. While the targets may have been different, there is no doubt that Hoxha continued to play the social card in Albanian politics with great success.⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

The complete transformation of Albania since World War II, both economically and culturally, are the results of policies that used the state and geopolitical trends to shape Albanian society in specific ways. As Albania is a small country often marginalized in theoretical literature, the important models of state development and the persecution of political hegemony which Enver Hoxha's state provides is often obscured. Albania's postwar history must be revisited for it provides a remarkable variety of complex interchanging currents which can help practitioners of the social sciences readdress their models and reconstruct their understanding about the idealized postwar Balkan state.

Integrating the observations made by scholars with research in both the Albanian archives and the British Public Records Office, the parameters of the Hoxha state and its particular qualities reveal that internal considerations and the dictates of historical specificity demand the scholar's attention. The lesson of the period studied in this paper is one that shatters most characterizations of Hoxha's state and makes the few consistencies of his regime (his social integrative policy against the Ghegs) all the more troubling. Ultimately, it has been demonstrated that while Hoxha's state maintained the

ideological and governing skill to manage a society, the motivations of power combined with a simple agenda, in this case a destruction of the social and political power gained by Moscow-trained cadres, helped sustain this incestuous and fratricidal regime. The use of collective fear to manipulate a form of class warfare that lead to the reaffirmation of state power should cause all of us as historians and social scientists to reconsider the utility of system analysis if we do not integrate a thorough understanding of the internal dynamics of any given society.

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NOTES

1. Quoted from the official newspaper of Enver Hoxha's party, *Zëri i Popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1966. Note: all translations are the mine unless noted.

2. The official Albanian representation of this period is reproduced in *Historia e Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë* [History of the Workers' Party of Albania] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1978), henceforth *History*, pp. 192-509. For more details on the theoretical explanation of the period see Ndreçi Plasari, "Some Features of the Revolution in Albania," in *Konferenca Kombëtare e Studimeve Shoqërore* [National Conference on Social Studies], Vol. II (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1970), pp. 3-29.

3. I have addressed this issue in detail in Isa Blumi, "The Politics of Culture and Power: The Roots of Hoxha's Postwar State," *East European Quarterly*, XXXI, No. 3, pp. 409-428. See especially pp. 409-410.

4. Stalin had masterfully used Hoxha as a counter-weight to Tito's growing influence in the Balkans during the 1945-1948 period. See Enver Hoxha, *With Stalin: Memoirs* (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Pub. House, 1980), pp. 87-126.

5. In a dramatic shift, all loyal purveyors of the Soviet line in Albania, the hundreds of Moscow-trained specialists and party ideologues, became potential agents for the increasingly hostile Moscow regime. Any analysis of the policies in the 1960s must, therefore, take into account Enver Hoxha's concerns about this generation of cadres he himself cultivated during the previous two decades. See Sotir Madhi, "The Struggle of the APL Against Rightist Opportunism," *Studime Historike* (Tirana), No. 3 (1967), pp. 49-53.

6. Örjan Sjöberg, *Rural Change and Development in Albania* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 81-107; and Besim Bardhoshi and Theodor Kareco, *Zhvillimi Ekonomik në Shqipëri, 1944-74* [Economic and social development in Albania, 1944-74] (Tiranë: M. Duri Press, 1974).

7. As noted during the second World War, Enver Hoxha had little sense of ideological loyalty to world Communism or his Western allies. See Great Britain, Public

Record Office Foreign Office 371/43553 Major MacLean's report, page 3 and Philip Broad's report in PRO FO 371/43564 f. 55.

8. Despite the fact that the invasion of Hungary in 1956 could have been (and probably was) construed as a sign of the times for problematic clients such as Hoxha and his so-called "Stalinist" society, the official Soviet line, that is the Khrushchev line, was wholeheartedly supported by way of public celebration of the attack on Hungarian revisionism and a continued glorification of the Soviet leadership. Such outward support, however, should not determine our understanding of the domestic ramifications of the transitions taking place in the Soviet Union. Compare the enthusiastic support Hoxha gave to the 1956 invasion with the incriminations after the repression of the Prague Spring in 1968. See *Zëri i Popullit*, August 27, 1968 and *Information Bulletin of APL-CC* (Tirana, 1968), No. 3.

9. During this period repeated suggestions within the Cominform context for the Balkans to become flower gardens of richer Northern socialist countries constantly reminded Hoxha's regime that its individual role in the larger context of Soviet internationalism was inconsequential to seemingly larger agendas. It is helpful to keep this dynamic in mind as one begins to seek to explain the eventual rift between Hoxha and Khrushchev. See Enver Hoxha, *Les Khrouchtcheviens* [Souvenirs] (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Pub. House, 1980) and Michael Kaser, *COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 64-66.

10. British intelligence, by way of the French Embassy in Tirana, advised the foreign ministry of an imminent coup in Albania in 1960. At the time, the notion that Enver Hoxha would publicly seek assistance from the Chinese and Chairman Mao was an improbable proposition to all observers of Balkan politics. Many within the Western intelligence community subsequently theorized that the anti-Soviet rhetoric coming from Hysni Kapo, number three in Tirana, was a direct challenge to Hoxha who was still, it was assumed, a loyal Soviet ally. PRO FO 371/152804 and PRO FO 371/160177. Both the *Daily Telegraph* (Dec. 22, 1960) and the *Guardian* (Jan. 7, 1961) predicted Enver Hoxha would fall from power on account of these apparent challenges to his power coming from pro-Chinese elements. What I call the Chinese conversion reveals the fact that Hoxha was actually willing to compromise his ideological position to accommodate a new, far removed ally; this gives the student of Albanian politics an indication just how dangerous the period was for the regime and an opportunity to reinterpret the cultural revolution.

11. See Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance* (Boulder: Westview Special Series in International Relations, 1986), pp. 26-29; Enver Hoxha, *Veptra* [Works] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1979), Vol. 19, p. 15. The official relationship started as early as October 1956 when Hoxha first visited Beijing. William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 28.

12. *Kongresi IV i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë* [The Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor] (Tirana, 1961), p. 148. Emphasis mine. For complete extracts see pp. 13-167. The signs of collaboration between China and Albania during this period are intriguing and should be investigated at some time in the future. As will be evidenced throughout this paper, campaigns both in China and Albania share a general thrust, spirit and stated goals that cannot be discounted as historical coincidence. The Chinese Communist Party for instance, commenced their campaign for a "socialist education" in September 1962, compared to the APL Congress held on February 13-20, 1961.

13. The fact that there was such a campaign did not mean, however, that there existed any uniformity in the actual understanding of what was "pure" doctrine or not.

14. As will be evidenced later, the use of labor in lieu, many times, of education, became the principle means of assuring "doctrinal purity." Of course the extensive

labor camps already being used by prominent Ghegs suggest Hoxha's gulag had a capacity to grow in value. For a detailed account of the educational reform program see Hamid Beqja, *Riorganizimi i Shkollës në RPSH*. [The Reorganization of Schools in the PRA] (Tirana: Naim Frashëri, 1964).

15. Added to the public condemnation of Liri Belishova, the prominent pro-Soviet cultural minister, which caused a great deal of speculation among citizens and the small diplomatic community in Albania, the visible departure of Soviet specialists, including the architects of the most prominent modern building in Tirana, the Hall of the People, gave Tirana the air of impending doom. A novel by Ismail Kadare verifies such an atmosphere enveloped Albanian society in such times of transition. See *The Concert* (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc. 1994). Interview, January 1995, Tirana. Please note, interviews cited were conducted in a considerably different political environment in Albania. It is my intention to maintain the anonymity of my friends and colleagues both because it was requested from most and it is the only responsible thing I can do at this uncertain period in Albania.

16. See W.E. Griffith, *Albania*, pp. 168-176.

17. See *Drita* (Tirana), May 7, 1963 and *Zëri i Popullit*, May 9, 1963.

18. There is evidence that the state saw its influence in rural areas diminish, particularly in the South, and new measures were needed to ensure absolute stability. *Zëri i Popullit*, June 9, 1963.

19. See Arshi Pipa, "Albanian Literature: Social Perspectives," *Albanische Forschungen*, Vol. 19 (Munich: Trofenik, 1978) and Peter Prifti, "The Albanian Party of Labor and the Intelligentsia," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1974), pp. 307-335. It is by no coincidence that Ismail Kadare, Albania's most heralded writer and self-proclaimed father of Albanian democracy, like Hoxha a native of Gjiorkastra, became the state's number one intellectual at this time.

20. Again, in a spat of collaboration, or plagiarism (it is not clear how intensively the Chinese and Albanians actually collaborated on ideas), Hoxha's closing remarks at the Plenum outlining Party goals, paralleled the remarks on the issues facing world Communism made in an editorial of a Peking newspaper on July 14, 1964, five days before Hoxha made his. In Albania, Hoxha's remarks were published in *Zëri i Popullit*, July 19, 1964 and the Chinese editorial that inspired Hoxha appeared on July 24, 1964 in the same publication.

21. Hoxha's remarks are found in *Raporte e Fjalime, 1965-1966* [Reports and Speeches, 1965-66] (Tirana, 1971), pp. 134-65. Ramiz Alia's comments are recorded in *Zëri i Popullit*, October 28, 1965.

22. *Information Bulletin of the Central Committee of the PLA*, No. 4 (1968), p. 19, emphasis mine.

23. Like Dhimiter Shuteriqi's slavish support of Hoxha's "Toskification," the Gheg *parvenu* is the ideal candidate for loyalty. See Arshi Pipa, *The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), pp. 129-131. Nevertheless, Alia's opportunism did not stop him from attempting, in the most discreet of ways, to limit the complete destruction of Gheg culture. Arshi Pipa was one of many Gheg intellectuals aided by Alia and allowed to flee Albania in the 1950s and 1960s.

24. It is probably during this period that Hoxha began to consolidate the regime around his family and allies: "Half or more, of the 53 members of the CC APL are related. First, we have four couples: Enver Hoxha and his wife Nexhmije Hoxha; Mehmet Shehu and his wife Figrete Shehu; Hysni Kapo and his wife Vito Kapo; and Josif Pashko with his wife Eleni Terezi. The wives of Manush Myftiu, Politburo member, and of Pilo Peristeri, candidate-member of the Politburo, are sisters. Kadri Habiu, candidate-member of the Politburo and Minister of Internal Affairs is the husband of Mehmet Shehu's sister. The brother of Kapo's wife is Piro Kondi, also a member." W.E. Griffith, *Albania*, pp. 319-320.

25. The subtlety is fascinating. Of course the party line was followed but it was not at all clear what was the party line. "First the Soviet Union is the guide to prosperity then it is a 'chamber of witches,' then workers and artists alike are questioned for their diligence. What exactly did the plant director think entailed the party line was purposely made unclear." Interview, Tetovë, Macedonia, July 1995.

26. See *PPSh Dokumenta kryesore* [Major Documents of the PLA] (Tirana: Librit Politik, Vol. 4, pp. 539-57 for the full text.

27. Adi Schnytzer, *Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982), p. 30.

28. *Zëri i Popullit*, Dec. 26, 1965.

29. For a detailed documentary account of the December 1965 APL directives, see *Dokumenta Kryesore të Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë* [Principal Documents of the Albanian Party of Labor], Vol. 4, pp. 602-14.

30. *History*, pp. 568-9.

31. *History*, p. 569, emphasis mine.

32. Arshi Pipa, *Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-political Aspects* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 35-48.

33. A similar situation with "Status Groups" occurred in China. See Lynn T. White, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 10-15.

34. See H. Toska, in *Information Bulletin of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania*, No. 1 (1967), p. 188.

35. Kaser was the principle resource for the US State Department and Congress on the Albanian political climate throughout the 70s and 80s. As a result, the US had a poor understanding of political conditions in Albania and were unlikely to take advantage of the many opportunities that materialized later. See Michael Kaser, "Trade and Aid in the Albanian Economy," in Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki* (Washington, D.C., 1977).

36. Nicholas Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 175.

37. *Rruga e Partisë*, No. 3, 1966, p. 2; In *History* there are extracts, pp. 564-8.

38. *Zëri i Popullit*, March 6, 1966.

39. Also in *History*, pp. 564-65.

40. *Zëri i Popullit*, Nov. 2, 1966. The Congress was held November 1-8, 1966.

41. *Rruga e Partisë*, No. 12, 1969 pp. 3-37 and *Zëri i Popullit* January 4, 1970.

42. *Përmbledhëse e përgjithshme e legjislacionit në fuqi të RPSH (1945-1971)* [General Collection of Legislation in Force in PRA] (Tirana, 1971), p. 89.

43. Enver Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968* (Tirana: Naim Frashëri, 1981), p. 31.

44. Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, pp. 50-51.

45. Hoxha *Speeches, 1967-1968*, pp. 33-34.

46. *Zëri i Popullit*, March 18, 1966.

47. The United Trade Unions of Albania (April 24-26), the Union of Albanian Labor Youth (June 26-29), the Democratic Front (September 14-16), and the Union of Albanian Women (October 25-28).

48. Interview, Tirana January, 1995.

49. Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, , pp. 3-59.

50. Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, pp. 225-250.

51. A variety of public holidays were introduced to replace religious holidays, churches and mosques were transformed into gymnasiums and Party centers and most of the remaining clergy were removed from their church or mosque and sent to labor camps for "re-education." In 1967 Hoxha officially declared Albania an Atheistic State. See Petro Lalaj et al., eds., *Materiale mbi Lëvizjen Revolucionare Kundër Fesë* [Material On the Revolutionary Movement Against Religion] (Tirana: Librit Politik, 1973), pp. 29-36 and Hulusi Hako, *Akuzojmë Fenë* [We Accuse Religion] (Tirana: Naim Frashëri, 1968), pp. 113-21.

52. *History*, p. 616.

53. "They had endless rows of men, all of us sweating and dirty under the sun, digging endlessly deeper into the side of the mountain. We were supposed to be building terraces in order to plant orange trees, but it was obvious to many of us that when it was our time to return back to our old jobs, we would not be leaving." Interview, Elbasan, Albania. January 1995.

54. Within a record period of time the reorganization of the state and Party apparatus in the center and in the districts on a sounder revolutionary basis was affected. "The administrations of state enterprises and agricultural cooperatives were also reorganized and simplified. The number of ministries were reduced, unnecessary offices and branches were amalgamated." *History*, p. 568 and "democratization of the party took place with an expansion of its base." *Kongresi VI i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë* [The Sixth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor] (Tirana, 1972), pp. 476-480.

55. The slogan of the V Party Congress encouraged activists to "Take to the hills and mountains: make them as beautiful and as fertile as the plains." (*History*, p. 584) See also Michael Kaser, in Wiles, ed., *Prediction of Communist Economic Performance* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971). This indicates how thorough the cultural revolution was: it not only weeded out dangerous bureaucrats but it repopulated Northern areas with a new type of Albanian. All this has been inexcusably supported in the modernization literature by in large due to the "considerable infrastructural investment and social consumption: every village now has a health center, electricity and the telephone, almost every village is accessible by motorable road." Hans-Herman Höhmann, Michael Kaser, Karl C. Thalheim, eds., *The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 262. Such commentary again seems to be driven by a more static notion of what was development and progress. Those same health centers, telephones and electric grids were instruments of a police state, monopolized by the forces of privilege to monitor and silence. Motorable roads serve no purpose for a population denied the right to sell produce or trade nor travel freely but were essential to the efforts to enhance the state's repressive capacity during this period.